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NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

Whether the use of such a device in North Dakota, in situations of the
Hermes v. Markham type, would be successful, is a question furnishing ground
for interesting speculation.
JIM R. CARRIGAN

STATUTES -TORTS

-APPLICABILITY

UNDER F. T.C.A. - Plaintiffs

OF

ANTI-ASSIGNMENT

ACT

TO

SUITS

brought an action under the Federal Tort Claims

Act 1 for damages to realty bought by the plaintiffs after the damages had
occurred. The assignor had leased part of the tract to the United States
Government and the unleased portion had been damaged by the government's agents. Plaintiffs took title as a result of a tripartite contract to which
the government was a party and which reserved to the plaintiffs the claim
against the government. Plaintiffs joined the assignor as party defendant.
The government contended that the assignment was void under the AntiAssignment Act. 2 The district court allowed recovery which the circuit court
affirmed 3 on the ground that the assignment was a "mutual mistake of law"
and equity would grant relief from the hardship that would otherwise ensue.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and held that the Anti-Assignment
Act made the voluntary assignment void. The court rejected the equity
theory and found that the claim did not fall within any of the exceptions
contemplated by the statute. The dissent felt that the Anti-Assignment Act
should not be a bar since all the parties were before the court and payment
of a just claim would be binding upon all parties so as to foreclose the possibility that any of the purposes of the Anti-Assignment Act would be violated.
United States v. Shannon, 72 Sup. Ct. 281 (U.S. 1952).
During the ninety-nine year history of the Anti-Assignment Act, 4 the
courts have recognized involuntary assignments as exceptions to the broad
sweep of the statute (aside from voluntary assignments made in accordance
with the provisions of the statute 5 or waiver of the statute by the United
States by payment to the assignee 6). Assignments by operation of law include assignment in bankruptcy,7 by will or by death, 8 and by subrogation.9
The early cases held that the statute applied to equitable and legal claims
alike, 1° and also that the assignment was void and unenforceable as be-

1. 60 Stat. 842, 28 U.S.C.

(1946)

§§921-946,

as amended,

28 U.S.C.

(1946

Supp. iii) §§1291, 1346(b), 1402(b), 1504, 2110, 2401(b), 2402, 2411, 2412, 2671-2680.

2. 54 Stat. 1029 (1940), 31 U.S.C. §203 (1946).
3. 186 F.2d 430 (4th Cir. 1951).

4. 10 Stat. 170 (1853)
U.S.C. §203 (1946).

R.S. §3477 (1875), as amended, 54 Stat. 1029 (1940)

31

The Act provides that "All transfers and assignments made of any
claim upon the United States . . . shall be absolutely null and void, unless . . . made ...
after the allowance of such a claim and ascertainment of the amount due and the issuing
of a warrant in payment thereof."
5. See note 4 supra.
6. Freedman's Savings Co. v. Shepherd, 127 U.S. 494 (1888); Bailey v. United States,
109 U.S. 432 (1883); Goodman v. Niblack, 102 U.S. 556 (1880); McKnight v. United
States, 98 U.S. 179 (1878); Thayer v. Presser, 175 Mass. 225, 56 N.E. 5 (1900).
7. National Bank of Commerce v. Downie, 218 U.S. 345 (1910); Erwin v. United
States, 97 U.S. 392 (1878).
8. See note 7 supra.
9. United States v. Aetna Surety Co., 338 U.S. 366 (1949).
10. Spofford v. Kirk, 97 U.S. 484 (1878); United States v. Gillis, 95 U.S. 407 (1877).

RECENT CASES

tween the parties." The modem trend is to the effect that the statute is
purely and simply for the protection of the Government and therefore the
assignment will be enforceable as between the parties to it.12 The courts
have enforced the Anti-Assignment statute with equal vigor to cases involving contract claims and those involving tort claims since the Anti-Assignment Act uses the unequivocal words "All transfers and assignments made
of any claim upon the United States." 13
In the instant case, the Supreme Court has enumerated the basic principles which underlie the Anti-Assignment Act but it is difficult to see how
those principles apply to the facts in this case. The first purpose was to prevent persons of influence from buying up claims against the United States,
14
which might then be improperly urged upon the officers of the government.
Here the claims were included as an incident or the purchase of the land.-5
The second purpose was to prevent the possible multiple payment of claims
and to make unnecessary investigation of alleged assignments.'5 The danger
of this is obviated where all possible parties are before the court in a single
suit 17 wherein all rights between them can be finally adjudicated. 1 8 The
third purpose was to enable the government to deal only with the original
claimant. In this case any damages proved could be paid to the vendor
and impressed with a resulting trust or subjected to an equitable lien in
favor of the assignee 19 since the assignment, though not valid against the
United States 20 is valid between the parties. 2" The last purpose, of recent
origin, was to save to the United States any defenses which it has against
an assignor by way of set-off, counterclaim, etc., which might not be applicable to an assignee. 22 The Government made no allegations of counterclaim or set-off in the instant case.
The Federal Tort Claims Act"3 declared the Government's liability for
the negligent acts of its employees "under circumstances where the United
States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with

11. National Bank of Commerce v. Downie, 218 U.S. 345 (1910); Spofford v. Kirk,.
97 U.S. 484 (1878); Porter v. Title Guaranty and Surety Co., 21 Ida. 312, 121 Pac.
548 (1912).
12. McKenzie v. Irving Trust Co., 323 U.S. 365 (1944); Martin v. National Surety
Co., 300 U.S. 588 (1936)
(equitable lien was imposed on money collected from the
government by second assignee who took with notice of prior assignment); Bank of California v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 133 F.2d 428 (9th Cir. 1943) (estate tax
case); In re Webber Motor Co., 52 F. Supp. 742 (D. N.J. 1943); People of State of
New York v. Hanley Milling Co., 41 F. Supp. 844 (N.D. Ohio 1940); aff'd, 123 1.2d
819 (6th Cir. 1940) (equitable assignment); York v. Conde, 147 N.Y. 486, 42 N.E.

193 (1895), dismissed, 168 U.S. 642 (1897).
13. 54 Stat. 1029 (1940), 331 U.S.C. §203 (1946).
14. Goodman v. Niblack, 102 U.S. 556 (1880).
15. Admittedly, the land could be bought as an incident to the assignment.
16. See note 14 supra.
17. 1 Ala. L. Rev. 308 (1948). Fed. R. Civ. P. 15, 18-21.
18. This is, in effect, the doctrine of res judicata. See Cumberland Pipe Line Co. v.
Spears, 208 Ky. 492, 271 S.W. 581 (1925); Good Health Dairy Products Corp. v. Emery,
275 N.Y. 14, 9 N.E.2d 756 (1937); Silber v. First Catholic Slovak Union, 23 Ohio
App. 198, 154 N.E. 350 (1926).
19. Martin v. National Surety Co. 300 U.S. 588 (1936).
20. McKenzie v. Irving Trust Co., 323 U.S. 365 (1944); Martin v. National Surety
Co., 300 U.S. 588 (1936); In re Webber Motor Co., 52 F. Supp. 742 (D. N.J. 1943)21. See note 11 supra.
22. United States v. Aetna Surety Co., 338 U.S. 366, 371 (1949).
23. See note 1 supra.
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the law of the place where the act or omission occurred." 24 The act also
provided that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure should control the prac25
These rules require the
tice and procedure of the suit under the Act.
26
and permit necessary 27 and
suit be brought by the real party in interest,
permissive 28 joinder of parties. Under modern statutes, valid tort claims
are transferable by assignment if they pass the test of survival 29 and the
30
The fact
assignee may sue in his own name as the real party in interest.
that the assignor was joined as party defendant raises the constitutional right
31
But the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
to a jury trial by the assignee.
are sufficiently elastic to try government issues to the court and private is2Yet the possibility that the Federal Tort Claims Act
sues to the jury.
may be an exception to the Anti-Assignment Act by implication was not
considered by the Supreme Court in the instant case.
Although the reasons for enforcing the Anti-Assignment Act are absent
from the instant case, the majority felt that recognizing the assignment as
valid when all parties are before the court would in effect, repeal the statute
by mere judicial construction in plain disregard of the unequivocal language
of the act.
JOHN G. MUTCHLER.
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OF AGENCY VOID. - The plaintiff orally employed defendant, a real estate
agent, to purchase certain land for him, but advanced no money. Defendant purchased the property but took title to the land in his own name.
Plaintiff sued to impose a constructive trust on the property, contending that
defendant had taken title to the property in fraudulent breach of their purchase agreement. Defendant's motion to dismiss was granted on the basis
of a specific statute covering oral contracts with real estate brokers to purchase property and making such contracts void unless in writing.' Upon
appeal, it was held, that the agreement created a relationship of trust and
confidence between the parties to which the statute did not apply and that
24. 28 U.S.C. §1346 (b).
25. 60 Stat. 844 (1946).
26. Fed. R. Civ. P. 17 (a).
27. Fed. R. Civ. P. 19 (a).
28. Fed. B. Civ. P. 20 (a).
29. Clark, Code Pleading p. 164 (2d ed. 1947).
30. Clark, op. cit. supra at 165.
31. See 59 Yale L.J. 1515 (1950).
32. See note 30 supra.
1. N.M. Ann. Stat. §75-143 (Supp. 1951): "§1. Any agreement entered into subsequent to the first day of July, 1949, authorizing or employing an agent or broker to pur-chase or sell lands, tenements, or hereditaments or any interest in or concerning them,
for a commission or other compensation, shall be void unless the agreement, or some
memorandum thereof shall be in writing and signed by the person to be charged therewith, or some other person thereunto by him lawfully authorized. No such agreement
or employment shall be considered exclusive unless specifically so stated therein." Also
see N.D. Rev. Code §9-0604 (i943): "The following contracts are invalid, unless the
same or some note or memorandum thereof is in writing and subscribed by the party
to be charged, or by his agent . . . 4. An agreement . . . for the sale of real property.
or of an interest therein . . ."

